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Old Wine in New Bottles? UNRRA and the Mid-Century World of Displaced People 
Jessica Reinisch 
 
By the end of the Second World War, millions of people had been forcibly displaced from their homes. 
Malcolm Proudfoot, who served in the Headquarters staff of the Allied Supreme Command in 
Germany, estimated in 1945 that over 60 million Europeans had been involuntarily moved during the 
war and immediate post-war period.
1
 Well over 10 million forced labourers of Allied nationality found 
themselves stranded on the territory of the defeated German Reich. In addition, around 13 million 
ethnic Germans were being expelled from countries in Eastern and Southern Europe.
2
 The numbers 
of uprooted people created by the war exceeded those of any previous crises. 
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration – UNRRA in short – was the first 
international body set up during the Second World War to make arrangements for the care and return 
of some of these uprooted people to their home countries. UNRRA was not created specifically as an 
agency to tackle refugee problems, but its work with displaced persons was crucial to its overall 
mandate to manage the transition from war to peace and to create the foundations for a new, 
peaceful world. Throughout the ‘forty years’ crisis’ reviewed in this volume, a series of organisations, 
set up by both governments and voluntary private groups, attempted to handle refugee problems. By 
the time of its creation in 1943, UNRRA was the biggest, boldest, best-funded international 
organisation working on refugee matters the world had seen. In its 5-year lifespan it organised the 
repatriation of millions of people, provided them with food, housing, welfare and health care, and 
opportunities for training and employment, and administered hundreds of DP camps – and thereby 
helped to define and re-define mid-century approaches to rehabilitation, repatriation and resettlement. 
The scholarly literature on UNRRA’s work with refugees has grown significantly in the last 
decade. We have by now a wealth of academic studies, including on experiences by particular 
national groups and in particular DP camps
3
, as well as broader surveys.
4
 This chapter draws on 
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some of this work and UNRRA’s own sources so as to attempt to place the organisation into the 
framework of the ‘forty years’ crisis’ developed in this volume. UNRRA existed as an organisation in a 
long line of largely piecemeal and provisional organisations, instruments and mechanisms. The 
chapter seeks to understand it as one particular solution, or set of solutions, to the seemingly-
perpetual refugee problem in Europe, developed at a crucial hinge point within the four decades after 
the end of the First World War. The chapter discusses how UNRRA’s work with refugees was planned 
and prepared during the Second World War on the back of these earlier efforts, and identifies features 
that marked it out from both its predecessors and successors. 
 
Planning for Peace 
UNRRA was a direct product of Allied discussions about a world after and without war. By the early 
1940s, when post-war planning began in earnest, influential assessments ascribed the world’s 
descent into economic depression, famine, ruthless racial conflicts and a second bloody world war to 
a number of factors. Chief among them was the United States’ retreat to isolationism and resulting 
absence from the international institutions created after 1919. Many analyses pointed to shortcomings 
not just of existing political institutions of the parliamentary democracies, but of the post-1919 
international structures much more generally. The League of Nations had evidently failed to transcend 
the great powers’ national interests, and as a result failed to secure agreement on collective problems 
such as disarmament and migration. Other factors highlighted by analysts after 1940 included the 
Allied powers’ failure to formulate an effective policy on Germany; European states’ failures to 
manage ethnic heterogeneity, particularly German minorities across Europe; and states’ widespread 
lack of engagement with regional underdevelopment, poverty and food insecurity.
5
 
 When American and British planning staffs began to prepare for likely post-war scenarios, 
they were reminded that the mistakes of the aftermath of the First World War were not to be repeated. 
They rejected the idea of formally resurrecting the old League early on, and instead started to draw up 
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blueprints for a new international organisation that could be created in its place. This new body would 
have to be supported by the ‘Four Policemen’: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China. 
Efforts to commit both big and small powers to a new international organisation were boosted in 
January 1942, when 26 governments signed the ‘Declaration by the United Nations’, pledging to 
uphold the Atlantic Charter and agreeing not to accept a separate peace with the Axis countries. For 
the rest of the war, the term 'United Nations' described the joint efforts by the Allied nations to defeat 
fascism and Nazism.  
Much of this preparatory work during the war for the post-war era focused on creating a 
permanent new successor to the League of Nations. In autumn 1944, the Big Four agreed the first 
blueprint of the new formal United Nations organisation during the Dumbarton Oaks conference. 
Further details of this new United Nations were debated and finalised at meetings in the following year, 
and in April 1945 the United States was born in San Francisco. The Preparatory Commission of the 
United Nations was established a few months later to make practical arrangements for bringing such 
a vast new body to life. Its Executive Committee met for the first time in August 1945 in London.
6
  
But in the course of discussions about the permanent new international diplomatic and peace-
keeping structures, it became clear that no collaborative or international effort, however ambitious, 
could even begin to implement any grand new vision for a world without war while millions of people 
were still uprooted, homeless, undernourished, sick, and without hope for a better future. With a range 
of academic studies and data at their disposal, several Allied organisations began to prepare for likely 
post-war scenarios, and drafted programmes for the immediate emergency phase – expected to last 
from the moment of liberation of the territories under Axis control until at some point after the armies 
were demobilised and the majority of civilians had returned to their homes. Most important among 
them was the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements (known as the Leith-Ross Committee, 
named after its chairman Sir Frederick Leith-Ross), established in London in September 1941, which 
tabulated the needs and requirements of the liberated territories in Europe.
7
 The Office of Foreign 
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the US Department of State (OFRRO) was established in 
November 1942 under the leadership of Herbert H.Lehmann (former Governor of New York) to 
coordinate the provision of basic supplies to civilian populations; some hoped that it would recreate 
Herbert Hoover’s relief missions after the First World War.
8
 OFRRO provided relief in French North 
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Africa, though on a relatively small scale. A year of this work provided ample evidence that the 
enormous problems of relief in war-torn areas would require international collaboration on a much 
wider platform than hitherto present. 
UNRRA’s immediate origins lay in these deliberations. British and American planners had 
been coordinating agendas at least since the creation in 1941 of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, responsible to both the American president and British prime minister.
9
 By April 1943, 
when OFRRO’s director Herbert Lehman and his special assistant Hugh R.Jackson went to London to 
meet with a range of Allied civilian and military representatives, including from the Soviet government, 
those channels of communication were well established.
10
 George Woodbridge, UNRRA’s official 
historian, credits these early meetings with laying the foundations for a ‘mutual understanding of the 
preparations for the postwar relief program on both sides of the Atlantic.’
11
 Both the Leith-Ross 
Committee and OFRRO assembled sizeable groups of expert advisers. OFRRO, in particular, proved 
to be ‘a magnet for progressive reformers originally drawn to Washington by the New Deal’.
12
  
UNRRA was founded on 9 November 1943 in Washington, when 44 nations formally agreed 
on the structure of a new relief organisation. Its main tasks were to ‘plan, co-ordinate, administer or 
arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control 
of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic 
necessities, medical and other essential services.’
13
 It was to offer countries assistance in the 
resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production, and the restoration of essential 
services. Finally, it was to make arrangements for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes.
14
 
The Agreement gave UNRRA the authority to plan, coordinate and implement measures for the relief 
of war-victims in areas liberated from axis control. In areas still under military control, UNRRA was 
obliged to obtain consent from the military authorities. Elsewhere, UNRRA had to be invited by the 
government of the area concerned; UNRRA would then negotiate an agreement, which specified the 
kinds and amounts of supplies it would bring and the services it would provide. National governments 
were UNRRA's clients and it worked through and for them, and only at their request.
15
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(Washington DC, 1943). On the limits of OFRRO, see e.g. League of Nations Archive (LNA) 
R5809/50/42186/42186, ‘Problems of Training for the Administration of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation’ [18 June 1943] 
9
 see Jessica Reinisch, The Perils of Peace: The Public Health Crisis in Occupied Germany (Oxford: 
OUP, 2013), 21. 
10
 According to Dean Acheson, Soviet officials were among the first to suggest a new international 
relief organisation, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department 
(London: W.W.Norton & Company, 1969), 65; and Dan Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN: How the 
Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace (I.B.Tauris, 2011), 121. 
11
 George Woodbridge, UNRRA: the History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), Vol.1, 23. 
12
 James A. Gillespie, ‘International Organizations and the Problem of Child Health, 1945-1960’, 
Dynamis: acta hispanica ad medicinae scientiarumque historiam illustrandam, 23 (2003), 115-142, 
123.  
13
 UNRRA Agreement, Articles 1 and 2.  
14
 Helping the People to Help Themselves: the Story of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (H.M.Stationary Office: London, 1944) 
15
 e.g. Woodbridge, UNRRA, Vol.1, 12. 
 5 
Administratively, UNRRA was an extension of a number of other bodies. Particularly in its 
infancy in Washington, before the beginning of any practical field work or the growing importance of 
UNRRA’s regional headquarters, the US State Department in general and OFRRO in particular 
provided UNRRA with staff (not least Herbert Lehman, whom Roosevelt appointed as UNRRA’s first 
Director General), ideas and plans. In UNRRA’s Washington headquarters, both the ‘layout of offices 
and of major positions within them’ drew significantly on plans drafted by OFRRO staff.
16
 OFRRO, in 
turn, relied on League of Nations’ experts – by now a group of them had moved to Princeton – for 
advice on staff recruitment and the management of relations between the various international 
organisations.
17
 OFRRO bequeathed a ‘vast body of material’ to the US delegation to UNRRA, which, 
according to Woodbridge, ‘exercised a major influence on the work of the Council in its First Session 
and subsequent developments within UNRRA, if not directly, at least by virtue of the fact that many of 
the individuals who worked on its preparation also had key positions on the various committees of the 
First Session and later in the Administration.’
18
 OFRRO was, in essence, UNRRA’s ‘path-breaker’, 
and soon turned into the US component of UNRRA.
19
 Nonetheless, while UNRRA’s structural and 
administrative origins were reasonably clear, the heritage of its ideas about relief and rehabilitation, 
and, importantly, its refugee mission, were more complex. 
 
UNRRA and the DPs 
While the war was still being fought, UNRRA’s staff of planners and relief workers in Washington and 
London spent much of their time anticipating, planning and preparing for likely scenarios, and 
presenting them at Allied conferences. For as long as much of the continent was still under Axis 
control they had little to do other than theoretical planning. Planners read academic studies about the 
state of Europe and its uprooted peoples, along with news, intelligence reports and statistics coming 
from the occupied territories. By late 1943, a number of detailed studies of the European refugee 
problem had been published and widely circulated. Among them was a survey compiled in 1938 by 
Sir John Hope Simpson, former Vice-President of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, on 
behalf of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, which discussed the consequences, in population 
terms, of the First World War, Russian Revolution and the recent persecution of German Jews. In this 
and subsequent reports he identified three groups of refugees who demanded attention: those 
Russians, Armenians and others who had come under the aegis of the original Nansen office; the 
refugees fleeing Nazi persecution in Germany and Austria who now came under the auspices of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany; and Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and other refugees 
fleeing persecution at home who lacked any kind of international protection and support.
20
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In the future, Simpson argued, economic development in rural stretches of Eastern Europe 
would be a crucial ‘prophylactic treatment’ for preventing Jewish (and other) emigration from those 
areas. But for those masses of existing refugees for whom any such economic development would 
come too late, Simpson argued, the League had to radically extend its scope if it was to continue to 
be the main refugee agency. One point was clear, he argued: ‘the main lesson emerging from a study 
of League assistance is the overriding necessity to treat the refugee service as primarily technical, 
and to minimise the political features of its existence. Extraneous political interests have repeatedly 
invaded the refugee work of the League.’ In any future arrangement, divisive political positions of 
leading officers and ‘political sectionalism’ had to be avoided. The refugee problem was ‘clearly so 
political in character that it can never be treated as entirely neutral and technical.’ But it was ‘all the 
more important for that reason that every administrative and constitutional step possible should be 
taken to minimise its political associations and to emphasise its technical character.’
21
 This sentiment 
was to become one of UNRRA’s guiding themes. Listening to Simpson lecturing on the subject, 
Norman Bentwich, a former attorney-general of Mandatory Palestine and director of the League’s 
High Commission for Refugees from Germany, thought that talk had given him ‘the strongest 
impression…that the refugee problem was manageable.’
22
 
Another scholar offering pertinent insights into the refugee problem in Europe was Louise 
Holborn, a German-born émigré political scientist who worked as a research analyst for the US Office 
of Strategic Services during the war, and published a series of papers, including on the League of 
Nations’ arrangements for the protection of certain groups of refugees.
23
 In a 1939 survey of the 
international organisations which took an interest in refugees, she noted that because the League had 
become ‘too weak’ to stand up to Germany and Italy, ‘the weight of moral and political authority’ for 
the protection of refugees had shifted to the newly-created Intergovernmental Committee for 
Refugees (IGCR).
24
 The IGCR was set up in the aftermath of Germany’s annexation of Austria in the 
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 7 
previous year, as a continuation of the efforts of the conference at Evian in July 1938 to find solutions 
for the thousands of Jews in Germany and Austria trying to emigrate.
25
 It was the first international 
refugee agency to be created outside of the League’s apparatus. It was also the first to be set up on a 
‘permanent’ basis (though finally disbanded in 1947), and the first to include a mandate for ‘potential’ 
refugees: people who had not yet been displaced, but whose displacement in the face of ongoing 
discrimination and ethnic conflict was likely and imminent. Holborn could not yet know that a 
reorganisation of the IGCR in 1943 would introduce government funding for refugee maintenance ‘for 
the first time in the history of international refugee assistance.’
26
 But already in 1939 Holborn was 
hopeful that the IGCR was able to manoeuvre in ways other existing organisations had not been able 
to. Nonetheless, she went on, the legal apparatus for the status of refugees created by the League 
remained crucial, and the IGCR could only be successful if it coordinated closely with other existing 
bodies and drew on ‘the experience and accumulated knowledge of those who have been engaged in 
the work for refugees.’
27
 
The new Allied planning organisations also began to pay closer attention to the problem of 
refugees as a key component of any post-war scenarios. Among the steady output of papers by the 
Leith-Ross Committee was a preliminary study of the immediate post-war period, published less than 
a year after it began to meet, which reviewed a series of issues to consider in the planning of relief 
operations. One of them concerned population movements. The movements of both war refugees and 
foreign prisoners in Germany, it proposed, would have to be regulated as soon as hostilities had 
ceased, ‘if serious disorders are to be avoided.’ The report provided few concrete details or numbers 
of likely population movements, but insisted that refugees would have to be treated in the broader 
context of post-war relief and rehabilitation measures. Its main recommendation concerned the 
administration of the refugee problem: a new body would have to be created specifically ‘to deal with 
problems affecting expelled persons, recruited labour, and, so far as they are not covered by existing 
bodies, refugees; in order words, with all those stranded at the end of the war.’ In order to be at all 
effective, such an agency would have to be launched by the ‘principal Allied Powers, and authorised 
(i) to apply to the competent authorities of the Occupation for the necessary supplies and priorities; 
and (ii) to enlist the cooperation and where necessary coordinate the activities of existing 
organisations.’ A ‘Director of international standing’ would have to be appointed to lead it, and he 
would have to be advised by both the Allied Powers and the ‘important existing organizations, 
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 8 
voluntary or international… The nucleus of the League of Nations Secretariat remaining at Geneva 
might perhaps be invited to co-operate in this task.’
28
 
A few months after this report was released, a meeting at the Fabian Society in London aired 
further predictions and proposals by a number of well-known British public intellectuals, among them 
Harold Laski and Julian Huxley. In the published report, one author, Kenneth G.Brooks, gave dire 
warnings about the scale of the refugee problem – ‘the biggest human problem with which we shall be 
faced in re-ordering the world after the end of the war’ – the magnitude of which was ‘such as to 
cause the heart to sink and beside it the re-organization of the world’s economic life may well seem a 
simple matter.’
29
 Although most of those uprooted would wish to return home as soon as they could, 
Brooks argued, repatriation would have to be strictly controlled, in the interest of preventing both the 
spread of infectious diseases and transport bottlenecks that could mean starvation for communities 
dependent on food imports. Like Holborn, Brooks thought about the agencies best placed to manage 
this crisis, and he concluded that the existing piecemeal, ad hoc organisations were no longer 
appropriate for a problem of this magnitude. Thirty-nine voluntary organisations dealing with refugees 
from Germany had been represented at Evian and were in close contact with the League’s High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the IGCR. However, he went on, ‘the work of the voluntary 
organisations has been mostly of a case-work nature and although the need for the sympathetic and 
individual help they have been able to give will continue, it is clear that the time has come for 
international direction on a governmental level.’
30
 After the war, the return and re-settlement of the 
displaced people would best be managed by an inter-allied body ‘working in close conjunction with 
the Supreme Economic Council which will be set up as the directing authority in the reorganisation of 
European economy.’
31
 Ultimately, the vast refugee problem was part of an even bigger problem of the 
rehabilitation of European agriculture and industry. Regardless of whether it could ultimately be 
solved through repatriation or through ‘colonization and assimilation’, both required significant 
amounts of capital for rehabilitation and economic development.
32
 
Perhaps the most influential study available to UNRRA’s planners was Eugene Kulischer’s 
The Displacement of Population in Europe, commissioned and published by the International Labour 
Organisation in 1943.
33
  Drawing on an enormous range of sources, Kulischer estimated that over 
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thirty million Europeans had been displaced since the beginning of the war, including at least 6.5 
million foreign labourers employed in Germany. To that number had to be added the millions of men 
serving in the Axis military, many of them stationed abroad or taken prisoner, as well as an un-
estimated number of people drafted to work in the fascist-occupied territories, and millions of 
Germans and Italians evacuated from bombed cities. Elsewhere, Kulischer and others estimated that 
those around 6.5 million civilian workers were joined by at least 2 million prisoners of war working on 
German soil.
34
 ‘If all these movements could be properly taken into account’, Kulischer continued, ‘the 
result would certainly be a grand total of over forty million.’
35
 By breaking down this mass 
displacement into different categories of people on the move, Kulischer hoped to ‘indicate.. the 
magnitude of the task involved in straightening out the population tangle caused by war and 
occupation.’ This was crucial because, he added, the ‘permanent resettlement of all these uprooted 
people will be one of the most urgent tasks of post-war reconstruction. It is an undertaking which will 
require the greatest possible amount of international organisation and collaboration.’
36
 
Kulischer thought that repatriation would be ‘the obvious solution’ for most, but would require 
great effort and coordination of strained transport systems and competing needs of occupation armies, 
civilians, repatriation and economic rehabilitation programmes. However, if they weren’t repatriated, 
‘the highways of Europe’ would be ‘blocked by long processions of destitute exiles, enduring every 
kind of privation in an effort to return unaided to their homes.’ Even once returned, repatriates would 
continue to require assistance to find housing, training and work. As such, repatriation required a long 
view that was part of a much bigger problem of rehabilitating the liberated countries – comprising of 
‘not only the reconstruction of the devastated areas, the re-equipment of industry, and restocking with 
cattle, seed, fertilisers and raw materials, but the reorientation of economic life as a whole.’
37
 UNRRA 
took this on almost word for word. 
Soon after its formal creation, a number of committees and expert groups were formed within 
UNRRA and began to make more concrete preparations.
38
 An early example, which allows glimpses 
into how UNRRA policy and procedures was taking shape, is a report by the ‘Sub-Committee on 
Policies with respect to Assistance to Displaced Persons’ submitted after the first session of UNRRA’s 
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Council – its policy-making organ – in Atlantic City in November 1943.
39
 The committee brought 
together well-known experts on refugee matters. Its chair was the Cuban Gustavo Gutierrez 
Sanchez
40
; other members included the British diplomat Sir George Rendel,
41
 and the US State 
Department’s Adviser on Displaced Persons and Refugees, George L. Warren.
42
 The report began by 
sketching out ‘the various categories of persons likely to be affected by the repatriation activities of 
UNRRA.’ They included, as Kulischer had already identified, UN nationals who had left their homes 
‘because of the war’ and were now stranded on liberated or conquered territory, as well as people 
displaced within their own countries. Only enemy nationals were formally excluded from UNRRA’s 
reach at this stage. The report estimated that in Europe alone there would be ‘tens of millions of 
displaced persons who will need to be repatriated to their homes.’ There was no doubt about the 
urgency of their repatriation. It was likely that the displaced populations would attempt to return home 
as soon as their current or previous homes had been liberated from enemy control, even before any 
‘adequate machinery to control or organise it’ could be set up. The greatest danger was chaos. 
UNRRA’s most important job was to organise these movements, in liaison with the Allied military 
authorities, and ‘to establish some uniform system of dealing with these persons, during both the 
military and the subsequent periods.’ The other reason for urgency, the report added, came from ‘the 
medical aspect of the problem’, already explained in the Leith-Ross findings, and UNRRA’s work with 
the displaced had to proceed ‘in the closest association’ with that of its medical and health staffs. 
                                                        
39
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Overall, UNRRA’s purpose was one of overseeing, coordinating and organising mass movements, 
and bringing people ‘home’.
43
 
In the following months, as Allied manuals supplemented these insights with further 
instructions, they suggested that UNRRA should be guided by a basic division between ‘refugees’, a 
label here given to civilians uprooted by war but still within their own countries, and ‘displaced 
persons’, or D.P.s – a term in wide circulation by 1943 – as civilian refugees of Allied nationality 
uprooted and outside their countries.
44
 UNRRA’s DP operation was to focus on the latter kind of 
person, while at the same time, though not spelled out here, UNRRA’s missions in the receiving 
countries were undoubtedly going to encounter the former.
45
 
One issue – already raised by Holborn in 1939 and periodically touched on by UNRRA’s 
planners, but far from conclusively solved by 1943 – concerned UNRRA’s relationship with the 
various existing agencies active in refugee work. How could all this work be coordinated, and what 
was UNRRA’s place within it? As one UNRRA memorandum from November 1943 explained: 
currently there were at least ‘four official international bodies and one semi-official agency concerned 
with the problem of displaced persons’: the International Labour Office (sic, ILO) and its Migration 
Section; the High Commissioner for Refugees coming under the Protection of the League of Nations; 
the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. 




The memorandum went on to demonstrate just how much the refugee problem in Europe had 
generated piecemeal, fragmented and provisional solutions, and a string of organisations with remits 
broken down into particular refugee groups as defined by nationality and circumstance. Indeed, it 
explained, ‘the term “refugee” has varied meanings. There are, for instance, the so-called Nansen 
refugees resulting from World War I, central European refugees who are mostly Jewish and stateless, 
and war refugees who have fled from military action.’ Similarly, the term ‘displaced person’ included 
‘prisoners of war, political prisoners, forced laborers, civilian internees, evacuees, displaced 
populations and eventually residuals of these groups of those for whom new places of settlement 
must be found.’ UNRRA had to grapple with the fact that ‘[e]ach of these categories of refugees 
presents a different problem requiring different treatment’; and ‘[e]ach of the foregoing organizations 
has come into being to meet a specific need’: ILO’s main interests lay with migrant labourers’ 
conditions of work. The High Commissioner represented the original so-called ‘Nansen refugees’ as 
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well as those fleeing Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland. The League had ‘always considered its 
interest in refugees of a temporary nature and with a few notable exceptions has never assumed 
responsibility for relief to refugees. Its services have been predominantly that of improving the legal 
status of refugees through provision of Nansen certificates and of securing rights of residence and 
work and the benefits of social security legislation.’ One ad hoc solution led to another: Because the 
High Commissioner had a restricted mandate of dealing only with refugees already outside of their 
countries of origin, the Evian Conference then created the IGCR, with its focus on the Jews still inside 
Germany and Austria and likely to become refugees soon. At this stage, the memo concluded, 
UNRRA was the ‘logical body’ to be responsible for all matters of repatriation and provision of relief to 
refugees, and only the ‘residuals’ would eventually be passed back to the IGCR. Above all, the 
current situation demonstrated just how much of a need there was for a new international body 
charged with ‘developing plans which Governments may support.’
47
 
The question of UNRRA’s relationship with other organisations with overlapping interests in 
refugees continued to cause confusion, in spite of various further attempts to explain it.
48
 Often the 
division of responsibilities hinged on artificial remits or technical definitions that were difficult to 
enforce in practice. Eventually, two principles were established: UNRRA’s work was to be defined by 
a focus on repatriation, and UNRRA was to be given the authority to supervise and coordinate the 
work of other relevant organisations. The IGCR was to step into action only for those refugees not 
falling within UNRRA’s remit, who could not be repatriated and for whom new host countries had to be 
found. As Sir Herbert Emerson, Director of the IGCR since January 1939, explained to George 
Warren, the IGCR was supplementary to UNRRA. ‘In countries where UNRRA has not a programme 
of general relief, but is carrying out special measures of assistance to displaced persons’, Emerson 
explained, ‘the definition of a displaced person as laid down by the Council of UNRRA is a person 
who has been displaced as a result of the war. There are, therefore, many persons displaced before 
the war who are not eligible for relief by UNRRA, but who do come within the mandate of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, and are in desperate need of assistance.’ Moreover, Emerson added, 
since UNRRA was likely to be active only in the short-term, IGCR could always pick up again after 





From its inception, then, UNRRA drew on and synthesised a number of assumptions about the nature 
of past and present refugee crises, as articulated by Simpson, Kulischer, Holborn and others. A first 
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assumption concerned the fact that any large and disorganised movements of displaced people and 
refugees would have disastrous consequences. They were likely to harm the ongoing war effort and 
post-war demobilisation of troops, contribute to the spread of diseases and put millions of lives at risk, 
and significantly limit any possibility of the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Europe and 
the world after the war. By the mid-1940s, nobody had to spell out (but some did) that refugees in 
general meant trouble and a drain on resources. For these reasons, any refugee movements had to 
be anticipated, limited and coordinated as much as possible. A single organisation – UNRRA – had to 
coordinate the work of the myriad of organisations with diverse interests in refugees, and, crucially, 
provide essential relief, chiefly food, shelter, clothing, medical supplies and transport. 
Second, it seemed a necessary consequence that any solution of the refugee problem could 
not be limited to individual countries, and instead required a broad treatment of the whole of Europe – 
or indeed the world. Reports by the Leith-Ross Committee were at pains to emphasise that ‘Europe’ 
would have to be treated ‘so far as possible as a whole from the beginning’, even if such a 
perspective would ‘demand an important intellectual and moral effort of the more favoured peoples.’
50
 
In Washington, George Warren agreed that ‘the problem’ was ‘European in scope and should be dealt 
with as European. The displaced persons come from most European countries, south and west as 
well as east, so that a plan which covers only part of Europe will not be a satisfactory settlement as it 
will leave large numbers of discontented aliens still displaced, a probably source of international 
disturbance and of political dispute between governments. The problem in western Europe is 
comparatively manageable to that of eastern Europe where questions of boundaries and confusion 
with respect to nationality will arise. The desideratum of agreement on a European scale can only be 
met with the agreement of the Soviet authorities.’
51
  
Importantly, although to many this appeared to be a clear and convincing tenet, the extent to 
which such a wide and deliberately ‘non-political’ geographical scope would be feasible in the post-
war world of trials, retribution and reparations was still up for discussion. Many relief workers soon 
pointed to a basic contradiction in UNRRA’s remit: although relief was to be distributed internationally 
as a means of treating and eradicating causes of poverty, ethnic conflict and war, the nations and 
nationals politically and geographically at the centre of the war were excluded from its reach. No 
amount of urging by Simpson, Leith-Ross and UNRRA’s planners that refugees were best dealt with 
as a ‘technical’ problem and to be kept away from destructive politics, could disguise the fact that the 
political realities of a defeated Germany were paramount. Similarly, the question of how far 
multilateral or unilateral action on refugee matters was possible or even desirable, and just how much 
the United States should not just provide the bulk of funds and personnel but also dictate the terms, 
remained a matter of debate. George Warren later remembered that he ‘disagreed with Governor 
Lehman who insisted that this problem of refugees had to be handled through the country 
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organizations that UNRRA now was setting up. I said, “Governor this is an unusual problem that 
supersedes any country interest. You've got to handle it with a separate organization, directly 
responsible to you.”’
52
 In 1943, Lehman and others won the case for a multilateral arrangement, but 
the argument was repeated in the creation of UNRRA’s successors, with different results. 
Third, at least since the Bermuda Conference in April 1943 most planners assumed that the 
vast majority of those displaced by the war would seek to return home as soon as possible; UNRRA’s 
main function was to oversee their repatriation.
53
 Although the dream of a mass resettlement of 
uprooted peoples to new countries and newly colonised land never went entirely off the table, 
repatriation to their countries of origin appeared to be a more desirable and feasible option for the 
bulk of refugees under review. The principle of repatriation then became further entrenched by the 
agreements at the Moscow Conference in October 1944, and again at Yalta in February 1945, that 
Soviet citizens were to be returned to the Soviet Union at the earliest moment, against their will if 
necessary, and by a much wider understanding that nation states had a right to demand the return of 
their citizens, and that it was the moral duty of citizens to return and take part in their country’s 
reconstruction.
54
 As far as UNRRA was concerned, the problem was a logistical one, requiring above 
all the physical restoration of transport networks and the coordination of different and clashing needs. 




To be sure, even in UNRRA’s early preparations there were hints at the complexity such an 
insistence on repatriation would entail, particularly for the Jewish survivors of the war. ‘To assume 
that all displaced persons may desire to return to their countries of origin will undoubtedly prove to be 
an oversimplification’, an early memorandum warned. ‘Even though nationality may be restored to the 
stateless, memories of the horrors and privations of expulsion from their home countries will remain. It 
is to be hoped that those who find their families scatted in many countries and who desire to rejoin 
them to start life anew in some other country will not be forced against their will by the operation of 
rigid procedures to resume residence in a country which offers no attractions or opportunities for them. 
The opportunities of immigration in the postwar world may admittedly be limited, but it will be a sorry 
world indeed if places cannot be found for those so situated.’
56
 Others pointed to the host of legal and 
definition problems involved.
57
 Nonetheless, it was its focus on repatriation that defined UNRRA’s 
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mandate and distinguished it from other organisations such as the IGCR. Relief workers were given 
clear instructions about the agency’s remits: it was to gather up the Allied DPs and organise their 
return; along the way, repatriates had to be fed, clothed and given medical aid, and until transport was 
feasible, welfare and training and employment would have to be found. 
 Finally, Simpson, Kulischer and others had begun to suggest just how much the problem of 
mass displacement was part and parcel of bigger problems of economic development, particularly in 
Europe, but also further afield, and had to be treated in conjunction. Without the repatriation or 
resettlement of the mass of uprooted people, no post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction 
programmes could hope to succeed, and another war would surely be on the horizon. In this way, 
UNRRA’s conception of the refugee problem as ultimately an economic one was quite different from 
earlier attempts to identify and tackle ‘root causes’ of migration, which had foregrounded primarily the 
League’s responsibilities to prevent war, protect ethnic minorities and secure certain rights.
58
 In reality, 
the stipulation, right from the start of UNRRA’s existence, that the agency was to be a temporary one, 
active only in the twilight zone between war and peace, and without the option of assuming 
‘continuing responsibility’ in the longer term, created severe limitations on such broad and ambitious 
proposals from the start.
59
 Nonetheless, even in its temporary life UNRRA was to take on the refugee 
problem, as far as it concerned those displaced by the war, as part and parcel of the problem 
economic development and agricultural and industrial rehabilitation. 
 
Into the Field 
UNRRA’s work with DPs began in earnest in May and June 1944, when it took over the British-run 
refugee camps in Egypt, Palestine and Syria, containing mostly displaced Greeks, Yugoslavs and 
Poles waiting to be repatriated.
60
 In the following spring, just weeks before Germany’s unconditional 
surrender, UNRRA ‘spearhead teams’ accompanied General Eisenhower’s staff (the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF) into Germany, and, after SHAEF’s dissolution in 
July 1945, the individual American or British army groups. As a direct consequence of the geography 
of the Third Reich’s wartime exploitations, the vast majority of DPs found themselves on German soil. 
By late April 1945, more than 15 UNRRA teams had gone ‘into the field’ to find them; by June there 
were 322 teams, ready to start their work.  
At the same time and in parallel, UNRRA’s country missions made their way into the receiving 
countries – 16 of them in total in Europe, most of them setting up shop in late 1944 or the first half of 
1945. All of them organised the reception and rehabilitation of those DPs who had returned. They, too, 
encountered other refugees; everywhere, people were ‘out of place’ and ‘not yet returned’. The Polish 
mission, for example, was heavily involved in the reception of Polish citizens returning from abroad 
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and their subsequent integration into Polish life. It also assisted the Polish government’s efforts to 
resettle the over one million ethnic Poles from the Eastern Borderlands to the so-called Recovered 
Territories in the West.
61
 Nonetheless, some missions were more preoccupied with explicitly ‘refugee 
questions’ than others. Most of the receiving countries’ governments went to UNRRA on the one hand 
for supplies for their home populations (including returned DPs), and on the other for the care and 
repatriation of their own citizens still abroad – but not for matters which concerned refugees of other 
nationalities still on their territories. The Yugoslav government, for example, tended to bypass UNRRA 
entirely in its dealings with the foreign DPs on Yugoslav soil. Its methods were, by one account, ‘direct 
and designed to eliminate camps. The refugees were simply sent to their countries of origin without 
delay or enquiry beyond that necessary to determine their home place.’
62
  
All parts of UNRRA thus dealt extensively with refugees and the many millions of displaced, 
uprooted, often homeless people of the war’s aftermath. But only UNRRA’s DP Operation is usually 
identified as a ‘refugee agency’ as such, in that it did not concern itself with other population groups. 
This DP arm of UNRRA’s activities – also the focus of this chapter – was by far most active in the 
western occupation zones of Germany, but also ran smaller operations in Austria and Italy. It did not 
operate at all in the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria; no official DP camps were set up there 
since refugees of Allied nationality were expected to be repatriated quickly. UNRRA’s DP 
headquarters were set up in Hoechst, near Frankfurt, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-
General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Operations in Germany and former Deputy Chief of Staff of 
SHAEF. 
For the arriving UNRRA teams in Germany, the first and most urgent task was to begin the 
process of gathering up the uprooted people of non-German nationality still roaming the countryside, 
and to take stock of who they were, what category of ‘refugee’ they fell into, and where they should go 
next. UNRRA’s formal responsibility, as defined initially, concerned those United Nations nationals 
who had been forced to flee their homes or deported to the Reich during the war, and excluded 
enemy nationals. Subsequent Council Resolutions extended this eligibility to ‘ex-enemy and stateless 
persons who had been displaced by the action of the enemy “because of their race, religion, or 
activities in favour of the United Nations”.’
63
 But most former enemy nationals, including the ethnic 
German expellees, never became eligible for UNRRA care, nor were those of other nationalities for 
whom there was evidence that they had collaborated with the Axis powers. In practice, before 
UNRRA screening boards could get to work to identify their ‘DPs’ from the others, the mass of 
displaced humanity had to be moved out of the way of military traffic and congregated into camps 
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(formally referred to as ‘assembly centres’), where they could be registered, fed, deloused and 
vaccinated, and their future transport planned. Camps made use of whatever housing facilities were 
available, and as a result varied greatly in physical size, type of accommodation and DP population.
64
 
They were often extremely makeshift in character, ‘frequently an euphemism designating an open 
field, or a bomb-gutted building, or a few tents.’
65
  
There is by now an extensive historiography on how these camps came into being, how they 
were run and eventually – though later than anticipated – dissolved, and how the DPs themselves 
organised their lives while in UNRRA’s care.
66
 For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth noting 
primarily the sheer size and scale of the DP operation. The numbers of DP camps fluctuated 
continually, as small units were consolidated into larger ones, and as groups of DPs left and new 
ones arrived. In December 1945, there were roughly 252 camps in operation in Germany and Austria; 
a year later the number had risen to 951. By the time UNRRA withdrew from the field in June 1947, 
there were still 762 camps in operation, including 8 in Italy.
67
 UNRRA was responsible for the majority 
of these camps. By the end of December 1945 UNRRA supervised about 263 of the total 323 
assembly centres, and was responsible for the vast majority – 81.4% – of the camp population, as 
well as a significant share of DPs not resident in camps.
68
 An enormous staff was required to carry 
out this work: over 8,000 so-called Class I personnel (those recruited outside Germany) worked at 
UNRRA’s DP operation in its first year in Germany. They were assisted by over 2,000 Class II (locally 
recruited staff) and Class III personnel (staff loaned from voluntary agencies), as well as over 100,000 
displaced persons ‘actively engaged in the administration of more than 300 camps with a population 
of nearly 800,000.’
69
 According to UNRRA’s own figures, in July 1945 UNRRA cared for close to 2 
million DPs in Germany alone.
70
 
In 1945, this was the largest refugee relief programme to date. However, the scale of war, 
foreign occupation and ethnic conflict had not only convinced planners that an organisation such as 
UNRRA was vital, but also presented challenges not encountered by previous or subsequent refugee 
organisations. Some of those challenges were no doubt similar to those faced by other bodies, even if 
experienced by UNRRA on a different scale. For example, like many of the projects emerging from 
the Allied war-time planning machinery, UNRRA’s work in the field was shaped by a fundamental 
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mismatch between planners’ instructions and aspirations on one hand, and the post-war realities they 
encountered on the other.
71
 Part of this mismatch stemmed from the fact that UNRRA’s policies 
contained a number of contradictory impulses. UNRRA was supposed to enact an internationally-
coordinated solution to Europe’s refugee crises, strictly taken out of the realm of high politics, while at 
the same time it was subject to political decisions, many already made before 1943, on those refugee 
categories that were deemed to fall into its remits and those that were not. Other problems arose 
because many aspects of UNRRA’s DP operation didn’t seem to have been planned at all, and in 
practice were the product of an almost constant process of improvisation. This necessarily created a 
few U-turns. To mention one, although earlier reports had been clear about the undesirability of a 
reliance on voluntary organisations’ limited, ‘case-worker’ approach, by 1945 UNRRA did not only 
work with, but also outsourced responsibilities to, precisely such voluntary organisations. Formally, it 
coordinated the activities of dozens of voluntary welfare agencies, including the Red Cross, the 
Friends Ambulance Units, the Joint Distribution Committee, the Organization for Rehabilitation 




 But perhaps the biggest source of problems, at least initially, stemmed from the nature of 
UNRRA’s relationship with the occupying armies, or the practicalities of a non-military relief project of 
this scale in countries under military occupation – and in this feature, UNRRA was unique.
73
 ‘I always 
did wonder’, wrote one frustrated UNRRA worker after almost two years in Germany, ‘whether the 
UNRRA high pontiffs who conceived the plan of forming such heterogeneous teams were most 
childish optimists, or whether they lacked even the most elementary conceptions of the very special 
and difficult conditions under which teams in the field would have to work and live.’ As a ‘civilian 
undertaking’ whose aims were not ‘even remotely connected with the military occupation’, the 
commentator went on, problems were inevitable from the start.
74
 In reality, it was less a case of 
planners’ optimism and more one of their attempts to shelve questions that could be dealt with at a 
later time, but the resulting complications were undeniable. 
 On paper, the instructions were clear enough. On their way into the field, relief workers were 
briefed that they and their organisation were subject to the authority of SHAEF in all newly-liberated 
areas. In areas under Allied military control, UNRRA was to operate ‘only for such a time and for such 
purposes as might be agreed with the military authorities, and subject to their control.’
75
 The 
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assumption that this could not be otherwise, at least for an interim period, had already been made in a 
series of earlier policy instructions about the armies’ role in so-called ‘civil affairs’, which predated 
UNRRA. As US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. explained to Herbert Lehman (as director of 
OFRRO) in June 1943:  
[D]uring the period of military government complete responsibility for all matters within the 
theatre of operation is necessarily vested in the Commanding General of the theatre. This 
does not, however, preclude delegation by the Commanding General, at any time in his 
discretion, of administrative authority to civilian agencies… In regard to supply, transportation 
and distribution arrangements, there is full appreciation of the fact that these must come 
under the control of the military, and that all communications during the period of military 
government must pass through military channels.
76
  
The DP camps thus remained formally under military government control, who were responsible for 
organising the required housing, supplies, and transport.  
In practice, this meant a severe limitation of UNRRA’s supposedly vast scope and promise, 
far from the notion of an all-powerful organisation dreamt up as an answer to the problem of mass 
displacement and the limitations of existing piecemeal solutions. One commentator in 1945 pointed to 
‘a considerable whittling down in the scope of UNRRA since the days of its planning by American and 
British officials in 1942 and 1943.’ Although UNRRA ‘was first conceived of as an agency of more or 
less supreme authority, empowered to assist in large-scale industrial and agricultural rehabilitation 
projects’, he went on, it was already clear that it ‘has only marginal authority, first because it operates 
only at the request of both military authorities and liberated national governments and, secondly, 
because it lacks supplies whose allocation must wait upon decisions of national supply agencies and 
the Combined Boards of the United States and Great Britain.’
77
 In administrative terms alone, this was 
a difficult undertaking. UNRRA was ‘at best a “junior partner”’, one relief worker observed in 1947. 
Field personnel had to take orders simultaneously from the armies’ DP-PWX branches and military 
government detachments, and UNRRA’s headquarters. As a result, the ‘teams had to serve two 
“masters”…, a condition that was never resolved in UNRRA’s favour…’
78
 
 UNRRA nonetheless carried out the bulk of practical relief work by providing the personnel for 
running the DP camps and the so-called ‘services’ – such as health and welfare, recreation, education 
and training – which were well out of the military’s remits. Relief workers did not just ‘clothe and feed 
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and house’ the DPs, ‘as the military might have done’, but rather attempted ‘to teach them to organize 
themselves and to build up their interest in life and their sense of self-respect, and to provide and 
promote education facilities, medical attention, and care of children.’
79
 Some scholars have argued 
that UNRRA’s greatest achievement concerned the institution of a ‘system of democratic self-
management’ within the DP camps.
80
 DPs were recruited from the start to co-run their own affairs, 
and ‘national leaders’ were appointed or elected to represent their cohort, giving rise to a fiction of DP 
camps as ‘model community of nations’.
81
 Their care became a formidable task once repatriation 
slowed down and the ranks of the DPs were swelled with new arrivals from countries now under 
Soviet control. 
 UNRRA’s relationship with the military authorities nonetheless remained strained for the 
duration of their co-existence. One source of friction, for example, concerned the requirement that all 
field personnel sent into a military area were required to wear uniform. Army officials were quick to 
criticise the relief workers’ ‘lax attitude’ (including, in the face of clothing shortages, their mixing and 
matching of British and US uniforms), while relief workers resented having to comply with army 
regulations.
82
 From UNRRA’s perspective, a constant strain were also the accusations that relief 
personnel were engaged in black market activities, which became, according to one report, ‘a form of 




Relief workers also resented the military’s lack of empathy with the DPs, which seemed to 
grow in direct proportion with the occupation troops’ prospering relationships with the German 
population. Captain C.E.Jack from the American zone’s DP headquarters observed that  
through no fault of his own, the D.P. makes a poor outward impression on [a military 
government] officer. His wardrobe is usually what he wears plus a few pieces of clothing 
stuffed in a bag. He has developed a defensive attitude as protection against German 
brutality. He has learned to steal to supplement the German starvation diet. He has learned to 
distrust promises and pieces of paper. His world revolves around food and shelter. In 
American slang he looks and acts like a “bum”. In contrast, the German is well-dressed, better 
                                                        
79
 101-102, UNA, S-1021-0002-07, F. Ashton-Gwatkin, ‘The Work of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration’, [1951], 101-102. 
80
 e.g. Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN, 120, 128. For a more critical account of the often 
ambiguous status of Class II personnel, see e.g. Silvia Salvatici, ‘”Help the People to Help 
Themselves’: UNRRA Relief Workers and European Displaced Persons’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 
25, 3 (2012), 428-451. 
81
 IWM, 98/25/1, ‘”Practical Christianity”: Major Heath’s Address on German D.P. Camps’ [undated], 
quoted in: Reinisch, ‘We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation’, 470. 
82
 See discussion about UNRRA’s uniforms in e.g. UNA S-1021-0078-04, ‘UNRRA Cooperation with 
Military Authorities with respect to Displaced Persons Programmes’ [1947], 21, and S-1021-0079-05, 
L.Doughty, ‘UNRRA, US Zone Germany, History Report No.7, Relations with Military’, May 1947, 35. 
83
 UNA S-1021-0078-04, ‘UNRRA Cooperation with Military Authorities with respect to Displaced 
Persons Programmes’ [1947] 
 21 




In this light, UNRRA’s field workers in Germany increasingly defined themselves as advocates for the 
DPs, many of whom had survived horrific treatment at the hands of the Nazis, they pointed out, and 
now deserved special care. ‘The original principle that the DPs were to be given preferential treatment 
by the occupation authorities was seldom given more than lip service even under terrific pressure 
from UNRRA’, one relief worker noted, ‘and quite officially, even though indirectly, this original 
principle was forgotten.’
85
 At the same time, the army pointed out that their units had ‘neither the 
training or interest in the D.P. problem. Tactical unit Officers were trained for combat and do not 
consider that it is appropriate for them to be engaged in welfare work. Furthermore, their sole interest 
is in going home…’
86
 Unlike UNRRA, as Major General Hilldring explained the US State Department, 
‘the Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy 
on the field of battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs administration 
are incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission.’
87
 
The UNRRA-military clashes were perhaps ultimately a problem of UNRRA’s own public 
relations. Although UNRRA considered ‘public information’ as crucial for its success, and a staff of 
several hundreds of people were dedicated solely to persuading western taxpayers to keep funding 
UNRRA, in practice they had a rough ride. Public information officers struggled to bring across the 
limits of UNRRA’s responsibilities and room for manoeuvre. The organisation was repeatedly 
criticised for shortages and bottlenecks in transport, shelter and supplies over which it had no control. 
In reality, as one report concluded, a large share of the blame lay with the military authorities, who 
‘were constantly changing their policies, inviting UNRRA to come in and then countermanding the 
request, and later, when they did want UNRRA, failing to secure for it the necessary support from the 
local commanders who controlled transport. At the same time they were always ready to blame 
UNRRA if anything went wrong and to complain of its inefficiency.’ In practice, ‘the military authorities 
found UNRRA a useful dumping-ground for problems – especially that of the Displaced Persons with 
which they found it impossible to cope.’ Ultimately, ‘UNRRA saved the military authorities from much 
work and worry which they were less fitting than UNRRA to perform, but with which, for humanity’s 




There were a string of other problems that periodically threatened to derail UNRRA’s DP 
operation. But perhaps none was as contested and intractable as the issue of repatriation. Initially, the 
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main problem seemed to be an organisational, logistical one in a world still shaken by war, with many 
transport and communication networks still severely disrupted and overloaded by demobilising 
troops.
89
 However, most of the transport logistics were solved relatively easily through heavy reliance 
on military resources, and repatriation proceeded very quickly during the first weeks after the end of 
war. By early July, 2,326,000 of the 5,800,000 counted DPs in Germany had been returned to their 
countries of origin.
90
 But while the repatriation of western European nationals proved relatively 
unproblematic, it soon appeared that a sizeable portion of the DPs of Polish, Baltic and Soviet origin 
refused to be repatriated to areas now under Soviet or Communist control. What was more, during the 
spring and summer 1945, the DPs already in Germany and Austria were joined by thousands fleeing 
westwards from eastern European countries and seeking to qualify for the DP status. Faced with the 
prospect of never-ending streams of newcomers for whom ‘repatriation’ was patently not a solution, 
but unwilling to impose a blanket ban on them, UNRRA’s mandate was redefined to cover the care 
and maintenance of those who were ‘displaced’ by a certain cut-off point in the summer of 1946: all 
refugees who entered the American occupation zones before 1 July 1946 were granted the DP status 




This redefinition resulted in confrontations between the representatives of the Western and 
Eastern member governments within UNRRA’s Council. As one report put it, UNRRA ‘was blamed in 
the West for repatriating displaced persons to what was described as an uncertain fate in Eastern 
Europe; it was excoriated in Eastern Europe for caring for collaborationists and quislings.’
92
 Soviet 
representatives insisted on the repatriation of all Soviet citizens, regardless of their arrival dates in 
Germany or their requests or wishes, reminding delegates that Roosevelt and Churchill had already 
agreed with Stalin at the Moscow Conference of October 1944 that all Soviet citizens would have to 
be returned, forcibly if necessary. Other member states pointed out that repatriation was also 
necessary from a practical and financial point of view, since UNRRA did not have resources to run the 
DP camps for an indefinite period of time.  
Nonetheless, by the summer of 1945, almost 1.5 million refugees had expressed their 
unwillingness to be repatriated.
93
 By December 1945, UNRRA still supervised 263 of the total 323 
assembly centres in Germany, and had responsibility for 57.4% of all DPs in Germany. It also 
contributed to the care of 17,000 DPs living in camps administered by the British, and to the cost of 
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repatriating those who chose to return to Poland.
94
 Twelve months later, repatriation had slowed 
almost to a standstill. In February 1947, there were still 264,000 DPs in the British zone of Germany, 
367,000 DPs in the American zone, and 36,000 in the French zone.
95
 Instructions to UNRRA staff that 
the repatriation of Soviet citizens was a matter of internationally agreed policy, and had to proceed 
‘without regard to their personal wishes and by force if necessary’, did little to solve the immediate 
dilemma.
96
 As one order to UNRRA workers in Germany spelled out: ‘UNRRA and military authorities 
are in agreement on the advisability for speedy return of the greatest possible number of displaced 
persons to their homelands as quickly as possible. This policy represents the substance of resolutions 
under which UNRRA now operates and is in keeping with the Yalta Agreement, and the projected 
plans and draft Constitution for an International Refugee Organisation.’
97
 The Soviet authorities 
claimed that UNRRA assistance in fact encouraged DPs to resist repatriation, and demanded that 
UNRRA desist from giving aid to those who refused to return.
98
 But even UNRRA's institution of a 
Sixty Day Ration Plan, according to which all DPs willing to be repatriated were issued with food 
rations for a period of two months at the frontiers of their home countries, had little effect. 
As it became clear that many of the refugees would stay longer than anticipated, relief 
workers in the DP camps began to emphasise ‘care’ over ‘repatriation’ and developed a series of 
proposals for solving the problem of the non-repatriable refugees.
99
 The camps were turned into more 
permanent installations and equipped with nurseries, schools, vocational training centres, shops, 
hospitals and specialists clinics, and UNRRA became a major employer of DPs. DPs no longer took 
part in educational or training courses to ease their impending integration into their home countries or 
simply to pass the time, but to make themselves employable and appealing to new countries of 
resettlement, often with good effect.
100
 The tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies 
on this and other issues eventually led London and Washington to conclude that repatriation was no 
longer a viable solution to the refugee problem. The only means left open was resettlement, which 
was out of UNRRA's remit. In response, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was created as 
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Old wine in new bottles? 
UNRRA’s work with refugees was marred by a number of problems, most of them already present in 
some form from the early planning stages. It was a temporary organisation with a limited brief and 
mandate but an enormous set of tasks; it had to negotiate a crowded field of organisations with 
overlapping remits; it depended on the goodwill of often unwilling military authorities, to whom it was 
subordinated; it was supposed to enact a technocratic and internationally coordinated solution to 
Europe’s refugee crises while at the same time subject to political decisions on the refugee categories 
it was to work with. Its basic brief of repatriating the millions of Allied nationals who had been 
displaced as a result of the war became rapidly unpopular and unfeasible in the early Cold War frost. 
Whereas by some measure, UNRRA, ‘as a kind of international Santa Claus, was almost above 
ordinary criticism’,
102
 its DP operation came under heavy fire almost from its inception. As Woodbridge 
noted, no part of UNRRA’s work received as much publicity (positive or negative) as its work with 
DPs:  
No other field operations were to require the employment of so many people. Yet in no 
operation was so small a portion of the funds of the Administration used. No operation was so 
misunderstood within the Administration, by member governments, and by the public. In no 
operation was the early organizational control of the Administration so unsatisfactory. Yet 
again in no operation did the members of the Administration show such individual initiative 
and, it may justly be said, display such heroism.
103
 
By some criteria, UNRRA fits neatly into a history of refugee organisations that stretches from 
the first Nansen office to the UNHCR. UNRRA’s work with the DPs in Europe was conceived as an 
exemplar of a rational, technical, and primarily logistical solution to the problem of mass displacement, 
which, by shared procurement and distribution of supplies, could supposedly sidestep political 
minefields and save millions of lives. In this manner, although it conducted this work on what was at 
the time an entirely new scale, it continued prevalent functionalist approaches to population questions. 
UNRRA, like its predecessors and successors, also lacked a universal category of ‘refugees’, but 
defining refugees as a product of war made the refugee problem appear to be an ultimately temporary 
and solvable one. This continuity was no coincidence. UNRRA drew on and worked with a sizeable 
body of refugee and relief experts, and built on their insights. In the headquarters and policy 
committees, people like George Warren had worked as specialist advisers on refugee matters in a 
number of different set-ups before advising UNRRA, and continued to do so after UNRRA’s demise. 
On the ground, a significant proportion of relief workers had worked with refugees during and after the 
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 But in significant ways this work was different from earlier and later refugee programmes. The 
scale and nature of the problems faced by UNRRA – indeed which prompted UNRRA’s creation – 
was without precedent, and so was the political and financial commitment to solve at least one 
particular set of population upheavals. It is important to remember that UNRRA’s overall significance 
did not lie primarily in its work as a refugee agency. Rather, it lay in its uniquely ‘connected’ approach, 
which emphasised that broken infrastructures, economic and agricultural underdevelopment, lack of 
expert knowledge, and mass displacement were all part of the same set of problems highlighted and 
magnified by the war. Any solutions had to address them in a coordinated, consolidated manner, 
based on a ‘total plan’.
105
 In practice, the connections between the different parts of UNRRA’s field 
missions may not always have been entirely clear to everyone on the ground. Members of various 
country missions at times accused their colleagues in the DP Operation that their hesitance about 
repatriation was harmful to ‘the long view’ that demanded the integration of returned refugees into 
rehabilitation and reconstruction projects at home. Without the returned DPs, many receiving 
countries could simply not be rebuilt and developed.
106
 But this long view was nonetheless central to 
UNRRA’s entire existence. 
Driven by fear about a potentially catastrophic fall-out from the bloodshed, destruction and 
racial conflict of the war, the Allies poured unprecedented resources into UNRRA. The body became 
a uniquely large and capacious vessel for ‘wartime idealism’, as Ben Shephard notes
107
, but one that 
was able to accommodate a range of different priorities, ambitions, and preparations for the future. 
Many thought that UNRRA represented what the Allies had fought for: ‘freedom from fear, and 
freedom from want.’
108
 UNRRA was one particular product of the fantasies that had also brought to 
life the M Project and other dreams about overcoming the piecemeal, ad hoc approaches to refugees 
that had hampered work for decades.
109
 But unlike other visions, UNRRA was no mere pipe dream. 
Its implementation was possible only at that brief moment in the last years of the war, after the 
meetings at Casablanca and Teheran, and during the immediate post-war years, before the wartime 
alliance was broken up and the tone of all international endeavours fundamentally changed. Unlike its 
immediate predecessors and successors, UNRRA provided a joint forum for the representatives of big 
and small nations, including the Soviet Union and the United States. It was explicitly designed as an 
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experiment in international collaboration and as a placeholder for the future United Nations. As 
William Warbey, Labour MP for Luton, argued in the House of Commons in 1946, UNRRA was ‘a 
working link between East and West.’
110
 
As a result, UNRRA had financial and political resources that dwarfed any previous 
organisations’ budget for refugee work. Whereas in June 1939 Herbert Emerson, less than 3 months 
before the outbreak of war, still tried and failed to convince the leading powers of the benefits of 
international collaboration and agreements on the refugee problem
111
, by 1943 that was no longer 
under question. Emerson had been allotted measly funds that covered only his salary and a small 
amount for the office and travelling expensive of a small staff in Geneva and London.
112
 By contrast, 
UNRRA’s DP operation had operating expenses of over $82 million, and drew on an amenity supply 
programme of a further $7.5 million,
113
 and this expenditure represented only a fraction of UNRRA’s 
overall budget. Although the financial and material resources could never be enough, and although 
the United States’ unwillingness to continue to fund it meant it had to wind up long before the twilight 
phase was over, this nonetheless began a new trend of significantly increased funds and political will 
put at the disposal of organisations working with refugees. UNRRA’s resources for DPs were 
immediately dwarfed by the IRO’s annual budget of four times that of the UN, amounting to $155 
million annually.
114
 This kind of escalation of resources casts in a new light Zara Steiner’s observation 
in this volume that ‘[n]either individuals nor governments learn from experience. New institutions may 
be created but they do not generally develop greater competencies than the ones they replace.’
115
 
UNRRA is evidence of a deliberate and concrete (if short-lived) attempt to build on previous 
institutions and learn from their mistakes, at the key mid-century moment when everything still 
seemed possible. 
 UNRRA and its DP Operation were disbanded in June 1947, and with it UNRRA’s self-
consciously multilateral approach to relief came to an end. Subsequent arrangements were 
significantly narrower in scope, vision and extent of political support. The various components of 
UNRRA’s activities were broken up: work with (certain kinds of) refugees was parcelled out to the IRO 
and later UNHCR; health to the World Health Organisation (WHO); children to the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF); culture and education broadly conceived to the UN’s Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); reconstruction to the Marshall Plan; development to 
the World Bank, and, later, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). IRO initially had 
fewer than half of UNRRA’s member states on board; no Eastern Bloc country or the Soviet Union 
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 It was a Cold War organisation par excellence, and in crucial ways very 
different from UNRRA, particularly on the subject of eligibility. UNRRA differentiated between 
refugees who were entitled to the DP status and those who fell out of its remits, but did not deny that 
the Polish refugees arriving in Germany after the cut-off date in 1946, or even the German expellees, 
were ‘genuine’ refugees by some measures, even if, for political and financial reasons, they could not 
be ‘DPs’. By contrast, IRO’s mandate explicitly identified so-called ‘bona fide’ or ‘genuine refugees 
and displaced persons’, for whom it was to arrange registration, care and maintenance, legal and 
political protection, transport, repatriation or resettlement into countries that were able to house them 
– thereby making abundantly clear that there were others who were not ‘genuine’ or ‘bona fide’.
117
 In 
these terms, IRO introduced an entirely new approach to eligibility, namely, in Daniel Cohen’s words, 
‘the obligation for asylum seekers to solely bear the burden of proof in their claim of “genuine” political 
persecution.’
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 IRO operations ended in Germany in 1952. The closing of the last DP camps thus 
coincided with the signing of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, which defined a ‘refugee’ in explicitly 
political terms, and enshrined the distinction between ‘genuine’ political refugees and all others 
(including those fleeing poverty) in law. 
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